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2 Uneven Impacts 
of the Great Depression
Industries, Regions, and Nations
Carol E. Heim 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
The Great Depression of the 1930s brought hardship and suffering 
to many in the United States and in other countries around the world. 
The impact of the Great Depression was highly uneven, however. 
Although one-quarter of the U.S. labor force was unemployed at the 
low point in 1933, those who kept their jobs saw their purchasing 
power increase as prices fell. Statistical averages of economic perfor 
mance conceal a wide variety of experiences for individuals and firms, 
as well as for larger aggregates. 1
In this essay, I examine uneven impacts of the Depression on 
industries, regions, and nations. In discussing industries and regions, I 
compare the United States and the United Kingdom; in discussing 
nations, I examine less-developed economies in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia. Even during the depths of the Depression, some industries 
prospered. Regions differed both in the severity of the downturn and in 
the speed of recovery from it. Government policies created in response 
to the Depression treated geographic areas differently. New concepts 
of regions and experiences of regional planning also emerged.
In the United Kingdom, the Depression worsened the difficulties of 
problem regions, which were older industrial areas, and policy did little 
to help. In the United States, by contrast, government policies had pos 
itive (although largely unintended) long-run effects on its major prob 
lem region, the low-income, less-developed South. As Wright (1986) 
argued, these policies eventually linked the previously isolated south 
ern labor market with the national labor market and stimulated devel 
opment. In the international sphere, some less-developed nations also 
benefited from the Depression, at least in the sense of more rapid 
industrialization in the short to medium run. But for these countries, it
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was delinking from a larger economy—the international economy— 
rather than linking, that helped. Import substitution increased, and as 
countries became delinked, some pursued more independent monetary 
and fiscal policies.
My aim here is not to reinterpret the Depression as an unambigu 
ously positive historical event. If some industries or regions were 
doing better than the national average, that also means some were 
doing even worse. What I want to emphasize is that any major eco 
nomic change, or policy, affects economic actors and areas differen 
tially. Rarely, if ever, does it make sense simply to say that such a 
change or policy is good or bad for "the economy" as a whole. Wall 
Street often reacts negatively to "good" news of lower unemployment 
rates; such rates cause some to fear inflation. Similarly, the question of 
whether or not immigration is "good" for the United States does not 
have a simple answer. Even an episode as apparently straightforward 
as the Great Depression proves to have a complicated mix of effects.
INDUSTRIES
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, some sectors and 
industries were much harder hit than others. The United Kingdom saw 
industrial production as a whole, as well as the transport and com 
munication sector, decline during 1929-1932, but output rose slightly in 
services and distribution. Shipbuilding fell by 90 percent, mechanical 
engineering by 36 percent, and ferrous and nonferrous metals by 
approximately 28 percent, a much steeper decline than the 11 percent 
drop for all industry. Above-average declines also occurred in the drink, 
vehicles, mining, timber, precision instruments, building, and metal 
goods industries. Many of the industries with large declines were cap 
ital goods industries and/or were export-sensitive industries. Textiles, 
although a major export industry, saw relatively little change during 
1929-1932, as did clothing, chemicals, and tobacco. Output actually 
increased in paper and printing, leather, food, and gas, water, and elec 
tricity, at rates of 5 to 11 percent (Aldcroft 1970, pp. 42, 48-49). 
Employment and investment also rose in some industries even during 
the worst years of the Depression (Beck 1951; Feinstein 1965).
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From the perspective of business firms, profitability is a key indica 
tor of health and is essential for long-run survival. As with output, 
employment, and investment, profitability during the Depression var 
ied widely among industries. Twenty-one of 78 trade groups had prof 
its in 1932 that were equal to or greater than their profits in 1927, and 
in 4, profits fell less than 10 percent. The largest percentage increases 
were in telephones, grain milling, and electricity; profits in public 
amusements rose 24 percent. At the other extreme, in six trade groups 
profits fell more than 60 percent. For half of the trade groups, the drop 
was 20-50 percent (Worswick and Tipping 1967, pp. 64-68). Esti 
mates of annual profit rates for major manufacturing industry groups 
also showed wide variation during 1929-1932 (Hart 1968, p. 274).
The Depression hit the United Kingdom against a backdrop of 
longer-run decline and expansion of different industries. The major 
declining industries were the 19th century export staples of coal, iron 
and steel, shipbuilding, and textiles, which were regionally concen 
trated in the North and West. These industries already were in diffi 
culty in the 1920s as international competition intensified, but many 
industry leaders were convinced that their earlier good fortunes would 
return. The Depression finally quashed some of those hopes. By 1932, 
the Lancashire Industrial Development Council magnanimously 
announced that
now that some other countries have taken a part of the respon 
sibility for supplying the world with cotton goods, Lancashire 
is able to turn with a freer mind to the development of those 
other industries which the mighty importance of the cotton 
trade tended for a long time to overshadow. (Lancashire Indus 
trial Development Council 1932, p. 50)
Expansion was occurring in the inter-war years in a range of "other 
industries": new manufacturing industries such as motor vehicles, elec 
trical products, and rayon; diverse types of light manufacturing; and 
services. The percentage of English households owning a car rose 
steadily from 1924-1938, though at a less rapid pace during 1929— 
1933 (Bowden and Turner 1993, p. 245). Unfortunately, as we shall 
see below, the older industrial regions most in need of these expanding 
industries in the 1930s were not very successful in attracting them. 
The Lancashire textile region did better than the heavy industrial
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regions in Wales, Scotland, and northern England, partly because Lan 
cashire contained the second largest center of population and purchas 
ing power in England (Manchester/Liverpool).
Electricity is a good example of an industry that could thrive in the 
midst of depression. Output in the electrical engineering industry 
(including supply) dipped slightly in 1931, but mainly due to exports; 
growth in the home market was rapid (Catterall 1979, p. 253). Invest 
ment in electricity supply peaked in 1932, with expansion due to strong 
industrial and consumer demand and to technical economies leading to 
lower charges. Heavy capital outlays were needed in part because of 
deficiencies in electricity supply resulting from earlier delays and diffi 
culties (Feinstein 1965, p. 46). Consumer demand for new electrical 
appliances such as cookers, irons, vacuum cleaners, wash-boilers, 
washing machines, refrigerators, and radios remained strong in the 
1930s (Aldcroft 1970, p. 195).
It was somewhat paradoxical that the growth of demand and output 
for electrical consumer durables should be so strong when unemploy 
ment was so high. In noting the paradox, Catterall (1979, p. 272) 
described the inter-war period as "years in which Britain began to enter 
Rostow's 'Age of High Mass Consumption' in the midst of an age of 
mass unemployment." George Orwell had observed in 1937 that the 
consumption of cheap luxuries, particularly movies and mass-pro 
duced clothes, increased during depression.
You may have three halfpence in your pocket and not a pros 
pect in the world, and only the corner of a leaky bedroom to go 
home to; but in your new clothes you can stand on the street 
corner, indulging in a private daydream of yourself as Clark 
Gable or Greta Garbo, which compensates you for a great deal. 
(Orwell 1958, p. 88)
Gambling, "the cheapest of all luxuries," rose almost to the status of a 
major industry. Many were underfed, but everyone in England had 
access to a radio. Orwell concluded (p. 90) that "it is quite likely that 
fish and chips, art-silk stockings, tinned salmon, cut-price chocolate 
(five two-ounce bars for sixpence), the movies, the radio, strong tea 
and the Football Pools have between them averted revolution."
Recovery came more quickly in the United Kingdom than in the 
United States, where the Depression dragged on through the 1930s.
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Bernstein (1987) sought to explain the delayed recovery in the United 
States by examining varying experiences of different industries. 
Focusing on manufacturing, he argued that delay was due to a combi 
nation of financial disruption and long-run trends in the structure of 
consumption and production. Dynamic industries could be found even 
in the worst years of the Depression, but taken together they were not 
yet large enough in the national economy to pull it into recovery. 
Szostak (1995) made a similar argument, claiming that there were too 
few growing industries. He emphasized the problem of market satura 
tion and the lack of new product technology in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Szostak's study included nonmanufacturing; government was 
the only major sector to show an employment increase even during 
1929-1933.2
While most manufacturing industries lost employment, the bever 
ages sector did show an increase in employment during 1929-1933, as 
did rayon, buttons, corsets, and several industries in the foods sector 
(Fabricant 1942, pp. 264-332). Physical output rose in beet sugar, but 
ter, cane sugar, chocolate, liquors (distilled, malt, and vinous), malt, 
corsets, knit outerwear, rayon, collapsible tubes, and mechanical 
refrigerators. By 1935 it also had risen in radios, washing and ironing 
machines, and a variety of other industries (Fabricant 1940, pp. 382- 
602).
Throughout the 1930s, the food, leather, petroleum, and tobacco 
products sectors were relatively "depression-proof." Innovations in 
canning had become operational, and during the Depression house 
holds favored canned foods for their low prices and high nutritional 
value. The cigarette industry soared after a slight drop in 1932 (Bern 
stein 1987, pp. 53, 61-63, 70-72). Other individual industries also 
showed increases in output and employment (Fabricant 1940, pp. 382- 
602; Fabricant 1942, pp. 123-128, 264-332). Consumer credit facili 
tated purchases of consumer durables, as it did in the United Kingdom. 
Many households, however, cut back on purchases of consumer dura 
bles during the Depression (Olney 1991; Bowden and Turner 1993; 
Bowden and Offer 1994).
The aggregate net income of U.S. corporations declined drastically 
from 1929 to 1932 but, as in the United Kingdom, not all businesses 
suffered losses. In 1932, very large U.S. corporations still were mak 
ing profits. Among seven broad industry groups, all were profitable in
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1929 and 1930 except trade. But by 1931 and 1932, only public utili 
ties and transportation had positive profits; that group was joined by 
manufacturing in 1933. Within manufacturing, profit rates varied 
widely. Even in 1932, three manufacturing subgroups were profitable: 
tobacco products (13.1 percent), chemicals and allied products (0.4 
percent), and foods and beverages (0.3 percent). At the other extreme 
were forest products (-10.3 percent), textiles and products (-8.0 per 
cent), and leather and products (-6.6 percent) (Fabricant 1935, pp. 3—4; 
Crum 1939, pp. 17, 45).
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, then, there 
were industries that were expanding and profitable during the worst 
years of the Depression, and there were even more such industries later 
in the 1930s. Changes in long-run patterns of consumption favored 
some of the same industries in both countries. There also were impor 
tant differences. Building, for example, played a much more positive 
role in the United Kingdom than in the United States, where employ 
ment by construction contractors fell by 50 percent between 1928 and 
1933 (Jaeger 1972, p. 139). Traditional light manufacturing industries 
that were adopting mass production methods somewhat later than in 
the United States were also expanding rapidly in the United Kingdom 
during the 1930s.
REGIONS
In the case of the United Kingdom, a focus on industries in the 
1930s leads naturally into a discussion of regions. Many regions were 
highly specialized, and the fortunes of their leading industries were 
important determinants of their economic performance and welfare 
(Hatton 1986). This link was less close in the United States (and also 
less close in the United Kingdom later in the 20th century). In this sec 
tion I examine short- and long-run impacts of the Depression on 
regions in both countries.
While both countries had problem regions, these were of different 
types. Problem regions in the United Kingdom—older industrial 
regions—were not helped significantly by the Depression or by eco 
nomic policies of the 1930s. In the United States, the Depression ulti-
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mately did improve the economic position of its main problem 
region—the low-income South. However, this was an unintended 
long-run result of New Deal policies; in the short run, such policies 
favored the richer regions.
The 19th century export industries in the United Kingdom had 
concentrated in northern and western regions. Coal, iron and steel 
products, and shipbuilding were found in South Wales, Mid-Scotland, 
Northumberland and Durham, and West Cumberland. The cotton tex 
tile industry clustered in Lancashire. These regions already were 
declining in the 1920s, and the Depression hit them especially hard. 
The unemployment rate in Jarrow, a northeastern shipbuilding town, 
was over 80 percent in 1932-1933 (Wilkinson 1939, p. 192). As we 
saw above, there were expanding industries and services in the United 
Kingdom in the 1930s, but they did not locate primarily in these older 
industrial regions. Instead, they concentrated in the South and Mid 
lands, which were relatively prosperous throughout the inter-war years.
One might expect that unemployment would lower wages and 
attract new industry to depressed regions. Recent research suggests 
that local wages do influence business location (Bartik 1991, pp. 49- 
52). However, depressed industrial regions might be unattractive to 
business for other reasons even if wages did fall. Historically, 
resources (especially labor) often were not reallocated from old to new 
uses within a region. Instead, old resources remained unused, and 
growing industries incorporated new resources, often in new locations. 
In the United Kingdom, employers expressed a clear preference in the 
1930s for labor without previous employment experience (Great Brit 
ain, Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Indus 
trial Population 1937-39, p. 504).
Many of the expanding industries hired large numbers of young 
persons and women, rather than the older men being displaced from 
coal, iron and steel, and shipbuilding. Expanding industries also 
sought proximity to the market and concentrated in the South (near 
London). Young persons and women were readily available there 
(Heim 1984b). Norman Tebbit, Minister of Employment in the 
Thatcher government, observed in 1981 (a time of high unemploy 
ment) that during the 1930s, his father "got on his bike and looked for 
work" (Tebbit 1988, p. 187). But even if they had headed for the South 
in the 1930s, many of the unemployed would not have been hired.
36 Heim
During a time of general depression, there was little need to look to 
the older industrial areas for labor. Moreover, even if macroeconomic 
policy had succeeded in lowering unemployment and tightening labor 
markets in prosperous areas in the 1930s, organizational structures of 
firms in the South and Midlands were not yet sufficiently developed to 
manage distant branch plants in northern and western regions (Heim 
1983). (By the 1960s this pattern had emerged, and in the 1980s Japa 
nese firms investing in the United Kingdom located branch plants in 
northern and western regions, as well as in the new towns. Despite the 
availability of unemployed workers in the older regions, new labor 
often was hired instead. Workers without a history of trade union 
activism were preferred, and Japanese firms insisted upon a nonadver- 
sarial role for unions when they did accept them [Oliver and Wilkinson 
1992, pp. 46, 186, 226, 247, 278-280].)3
The United Kingdom did not succeed in devising effective regional 
policy during the 1930s. After short-lived efforts to transfer workers 
out of depressed regions, programs were established to finance new 
industries there. The Bank of England, however, disliked these initia 
tives and sought to keep them just large enough to forestall more far- 
reaching government intervention on behalf of the depressed regions 
(Heim 1984a). Compared with governments in many other countries, 
however, inter-war U.K. governments were not highly interventionist 
on a regional or national scale. While limited public works spending 
was undertaken, and there were some efforts to stimulate rationaliza 
tion and elimination of excess capacity in older industries, there was no 
equivalent to the U.S. New Deal with its wide range of spending and 
regulatory policies (Garside 1990).
U.K. macroeconomic policies since World War I had been oriented 
more toward defending the pound, protecting the gold standard, and 
limiting Treasury spending, rather than toward promoting domestic 
industry (Lewis 1949; Eichengreen 1992). What finally helped the 
declining regions in the late 1930s was rearmament and war, which 
increased employment in older industries such as iron and steel, coal, 
and shipbuilding (Thomas 1983). However, longer-run effects of the 
war and postwar military spending favored other regions. Research 
and development facilities in the research-intensive industries stimu 
lated by the war, such as electronics, chemicals, and aircraft, tended to 
locate in the South near London (Heim 1987).
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As a consequence of the Depression itself and the lack of effective 
policy response, unemployment differentials among regions in the 
United Kingdom widened. Taking the two extremes, in 1929 the 
unemployment rate in Wales was 18.2 percent, and in London and the 
South East, 4.5 percent. The difference between these two regions 
peaked in 1933, when unemployment was 34.1 percent in Wales and 
10.7 percent in London and the South East. For Inner Regions (the 
South and Midlands) versus Outer Regions (Northern England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland), the difference in unemployment rates 
widened from 1929-1931, dropped slightly in 1932 and was fairly 
steady to 1935, then dropped further to 1937. It widened again with 
the 1938 recession, before dropping in the war boom to about the same 
gap as in 1929 (Beck 1951, Table 18 and p. 36; see also Garside 1990, 
p. 10).<
Recession in the 1970s and 1980s similarly increased unemploy 
ment differences among regions in the United Kingdom (Martin 1989, 
pp. 31-34; Champion and Townsend 1990, pp. 131-132). Gaps also 
widened in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) between 1975 and 
1986. The South East, East Anglia, and the South West all saw their 
per capita GDP rise relative to the U.K. average, whereas that ratio fell 
for northern and western regions, and also for the West Midlands auto 
mobile region, which had become a declining rather than a prosperous 
region (Martin 1989, p. 40). This experience was shared by European 
regions generally: disparities in GDP per head widened slightly during 
the slow growth years in the first half of the 1980s, before narrowing in 
the second half of the decade and leveling off at the beginning of the 
1990s (European Commission 1994, p. 37).
Did depression and recession lead to divergence (greater inequal 
ity) of per capita incomes in the United States? At the state level, the 
evidence is somewhat mixed. Divergence among states, measured by 
the standard deviation of the log of per capita income for states, or by 
the coefficient of variation of state per capita income, increased both 
during prosperous years of the 1920s and in the first years of the 
Depression (through 1932). The remainder of the 1930s saw conver 
gence, which continued until 1978. Divergence occurred again from 
1978-1988, after which convergence resumed (Barro and Sala-i-Mar- 
tin 1991; Wheelock and Coughlin 1993; Sherwood-Call 1996). (Note 
that the 1920s and 1980s, when geographic disparities widened, also
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were times of increases in other kinds of inequality, such as income 
distribution.)
Unlike what happened in the United Kingdom, in the United States 
in the 1930s the main problem region improved its position relative to 
other parts of the country. This region was the low-income, less-indus 
trialized South, a very different type of region from the older industrial 
regions of the United Kingdom. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt still 
could refer to the South in 1938 as the nation's number one economic 
problem (Schulman 1991, p. 3), the Southeast's share of total personal 
income rose from 11.15 percent in 1930 to 13.23 percent in 1940, and 
the Southwest's share rose from 4.75 to 5.21 percent (Perloff et al. 
1960, p. 274). 5 Installed horsepower increased most rapidly in the 
Southeast and Southwest during 1929-1939, in the latter case at more 
than twice the national rate (Wardwell 1951, p. 91). Throughout the 
nation nominal per capita incomes fell in this decade, but the total per 
centage change during 1929-1939 was lower in the Southeast than in 
any other region and was also low in the Southwest (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1995, p. 11). The South's relative improvement was 
even stronger in the 1940s.
The sharpest drops in real per capita income during 1929-1933 
were in the Northwest, Central, and Far West regions; the smallest drop 
was in New England. The Southeast and Southwest regions, where 
income fell by 24 and 29 percent, did well compared with the U.S. 
average of 28 percent. The 10 states with the smallest income declines 
(12 to 23 percent) were North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hamp 
shire, Maine, Virginia, Rhode Island, Georgia, Maryland, Massachu 
setts, and Connecticut; the District of Columbia saw an 18 percent drop 
(Hurwitz and Stallings 1957, pp. 248-249).6
The employment picture for southern regions also was positive. 
The total employment index for the South Atlantic region was the best 
in the nation in 1933 at 88.3, when national employment stood at 78.4. 
The worst-off region in that year was East North Central at 69.5. The 
other southern regions, East South Central and West South Central, 
were below the national average in 1933, but along with the South 
Atlantic region made a very strong recovery later in the 1930s (Wallis 
1989, pp. 53, 56-64).
Some regional and local differences in income and employment 
were rooted in industrial structure, though it may have been less impor-
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tant than in the United Kingdom. In 1939, Fortune magazine reported 
being told in Houston, home to a booming oil industry, that "this is the 
city that never knew the depression" ("Texas" 1939, p. 87). Tobacco 
manufacture, an industry discussed above as one of the most prosper 
ous throughout the Depression, helps to explain the performance of 
some southern states. California benefited from motion pictures, citrus 
fruit, and later airplanes, while mountain states declined along with the 
mining and lumber industries (Szostak 1995, p. 307).
Wallis (1989) argued that the South's strong performance during 
the Depression cannot be fully explained by the industrial composition 
of employment. It did not simply result from the South having its 
employment concentrated in industries that saw relatively small 
employment declines during the Depression. Nor were certain institu 
tional changes associated with the New Deal (the Social Security and 
National Labor Relations Acts) primarily responsible. He concluded 
(p. 62) that "regional differences remain an important and unexplained 
part of the employment experience."
In their working paper on manufacturing employment change dur 
ing 1929-1937, Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997) sought to control 
for both industry and region. They argued that industry effects were 
important in some regions, especially during 1929-1933. For exam 
ple, the East South Central, Pacific, and Mountain regions, which had 
heavy concentrations of manufacturing employment in the lumber 
products industry, were hit hard when construction collapsed. Simi 
larly, the automobile industry had a negative impact in the East North 
Central region. But Rosenbloom and Sundstrom argued that region, 
rather than industry, effects were primarily responsible for the rela 
tively good performance of the South Atlantic and West South Central 
regions during 1929-1937. Their view was that in these regions, 
strong regional trends in manufacturing employment growth overcame 
negative industry composition effects. More research remains to be 
done to clarify the reasons for the relatively favorable performance of 
southern regions during the Depression.
Might the New Deal have benefited the South in other ways 
besides the changes associated with the Social Security and National 
Labor Relations Acts? Earlier research showed that, at least in the short 
run, southern states were not disproportionately favored by New Deal 
spending. Despite the aim of reform (which might be taken to include
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Even if New Deal expenditures did not favor southern states gener 
ally, the long-run impact of New Deal policies promoted southern 
industrialization. Wright argued in Old South, New South (1986) that 
two policies adopted during the Depression ultimately ended the isola 
tion of the southern labor market and linked it with the national labor 
market. When the South experienced severe dislocation, unemploy 
ment, and underemployment as a result of these policies, its leaders 
began to welcome capital and people from outside that would help to 
develop the region. The policies that set this process in motion were 
New Deal agricultural policies and minimum wage legislation.
Agricultural policies created incentives for landowners to elimi 
nate sharecropping, the system of farm production in the South that 
involved working on an owner's land and dividing the crop with the 
owner. Under the New Deal, landowners received payments for limit 
ing their production of agricultural goods; the hope was to increase 
prices of those products and thus farmers' incomes. However, if a 
landowner had sharecroppers or other tenants, the payments had to be 
shared with them. As a result, many landowners decided to dispense 
with their sharecroppers and other tenants and hire wage-labor instead. 
Displaced sharecroppers migrated to northern cities in large numbers 
in the 1940s and 1950s, when mechanization also reduced the need for 
labor on farms.
Minimum wage legislation, which applied in all states, also 
brought the South into a unified national labor market. The immediate 
impact of federal policies on southern blacks was negative. But the 
combined effect of these policies, and the resulting migration flows, 
was
the final disappearance of the plantation regime . . . Having lit 
tle of the old low-wage economy to protect, southern property 
owners opened their doors wholeheartedly to outside flows of 
capital, government funding, and highly paid labor. (Wright 
1986, p. 15)
Initially they pressed for the South's "fair share" of military spend 
ing in the 1940s. The East South Central and West South Central 
regions did receive a larger share of wartime manufacturing facilities 
than their share of pre-war facilities, although the textile states of the 
South Atlantic region did not fare as well (U.S. War Production Board
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1945, p. 36). Industrial development promotions exploded after the 
war, and especially after 1950 (Wright 1986, pp. 257-264). The South 
also benefited from spending on highways and from the federal home 
mortgage loan programs that had originated in 1933 and that stimu 
lated city- and suburb-building after World War II. By 1990, per capita 
incomes in the South still were below the national average, but consid 
erable progress had been made toward closing the gap (Heim, forth 
coming).
In the United States, then, unlike the United Kingdom, policies 
adopted in response to the Depression did have a positive long-run 
impact on economic performance in the nation's problem region. The 
problem regions were of different types: in the United States, a low- 
income agricultural area, and in the United Kingdom, older industrial 
areas. The U.S. West, a less-developed region—although not one per 
ceived as a problem region—also saw its development hastened by the 
water projects of the 1930s. The policies adopted in the United States 
(with the exception of the TVA programs) did not have as their explicit 
goal the development of lagging or newer regions. Nonetheless, in the 
case of the South, the linkage with national labor markets that resulted 
from New Deal agricultural and minimum wage policies did ultimately 
promote industrialization.
NATIONS
A fascinating contrast is presented by certain less-developed 
nations during the Depression and subsequent decades. Their industri 
alization also accelerated, but as a result of delinking from a larger 
economy—in this case, the international economy—rather than 
becoming more closely linked with it. During the Depression, export 
earnings for many countries dried up, and capital inflows from more- 
developed countries such as the United States were curtailed drasti 
cally. In parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia (as, well as in some 
Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, and in Australia), 
emphasis shifted away from exports of primary products (such as agri 
cultural products and minerals) and toward more import-substituting 
production of manufactured goods.
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The idea that the Depression had promoted industrialization in 
Latin America was advanced by structuralists (Prebisch 1962; Furtado 
1963), writers in the dependency school (Frank 1967), and others (Lee 
1969; Diaz Alejandro 1970; Fishlow 1972; Thorp 1984). Diaz Alejan- 
dro (1984) provided a useful survey of the issues. The international 
shocks of the Depression pushed countries in Latin America toward 
policy experimentation. Some countries were questioning the "rules of 
the game" as early as 1930. Commitments to the gold standard and to 
balancing national budgets were no longer seen as a necessary or desir 
able means of attempting to ensure national prosperity. The gold stan 
dard regime of the 19th and early 20th centuries had always worked 
less well as a stabilizing force for the periphery of the world economy, 
including Latin America, than it had for the more-developed countries 
of the center. Defending the gold standard became even less a priority 
under the pressures of the Depression (Eichengreen 1992, pp. 54-65).
Being delinked from the world economy, and from institutions 
such as the gold standard, allowed a different set of domestic policies 
to be pursued that were favorable to industrialization. Not all countries 
were able to take this path. Diaz Alejandro suggested that among Latin 
American republics with nominal sovereignty, largeness (as in the case 
of Brazil) and a relatively autonomous public sector (as in Costa Rica 
or Uruguay) led to more favorable performance. Smaller countries 
such as Honduras and highly dependent governments such as Cuba 
were less able to experiment with unorthodox policies. He noted that 
"paradoxically, some clear-cut colonies in the Caribbean appear to 
have performed better than Cuba or the Dominican Republic" (Diaz 
Alejandro 1984, p. 18).
What were these policies? They included balance-of-payment pol 
icies, monetary and fiscal policies, and other policies promoting struc 
tural change and reform. As export values fell and capital inflows 
turned negative, gold and foreign exchange flowed out of Latin Ameri 
can countries. Some responded by abandoning the effort to maintain 
the gold parities of the gold-exchange standard, thereby avoiding the 
difficult deflationary process that was part of the classical adjustment 
mechanism. Instead they devalued their exchange rates. By 1930- 
1934, real import-exchange rates with respect to the dollar had depreci 
ated between 30 and 90 percent, as compared to 1925-1929, in seven 
Latin American countries (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 22-26).
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Imports also were discouraged by higher tariffs and by quantitative 
restrictions, such as import or exchange controls. Several countries 
(Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Cuba) used delinquency on 
their international debt payments to alleviate balance-of-payments dif 
ficulties (Maddison 1985, pp. 23-32). U.S. tolerance of partial or total 
defaults by Brazil contrasted with British insistence on repayment by 
both Brazil and Argentina. This tolerance was especially important for 
Brazil, which had a more binding foreign-exchange constraint than 
Argentina in the 1930s (Abreu 1984, pp. 150-152). Other outward 
flows were limited by Latin American authorities: importers seeking to 
settle their short-term debts, and foreign companies wanting to remit 
profits abroad, had to wait to obtain the necessary foreign exchange 
(Dfaz Alejandro 1984, p. 27).
Latin American countries also had serious debt problems in the 
1980s, following the difficult years in the world economy after 1973 
and the recession of 1980-1982. Again, many debts were rescheduled. 
In this debt crisis, unlike that of the 1930s, the International Monetary 
Fund acted as a "system manager," providing emergency credit and 
pressuring other creditors into helping. But it also imposed strict con 
ditions on domestic policy, including budgetary restrictions and other 
deflationary measures that increased unemployment (Maddison 1985, 
pp. 45-66).
In the 1930s, Latin American governments could, and did, engage 
in more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. The policies gener 
ally were not motivated by a conscious and deliberate program, but 
together they contributed to the maintenance of aggregate demand. 
Real money supplies increased in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Uruguay. Central banks found creative ways to issue 
domestic currency and increase credit in their economies. Banks gen 
erally were not allowed to fail, in sharp contrast to the situation in the 
United States (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 29-31). Increases in the 
money supply were facilitated by greater leniency in terms of bank 
reserves (Twomey 1983, p. 243).
Similarly, fiscal policy helped to maintain aggregate demand. 
Brazil's policy after 1932 was deliberately expansionary, with 
planned deficits resulting from conscious additional expenditure. 
Government support for the coffee sector, through export taxes and 
acquisition of coffee, also helped to hold up that sector's income
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(Fishlow 1972, pp. 328-330). In other countries, despite declara 
tions by policymakers that they sought to balance their budgets, 
"efforts to reduce the deficit induced by the decline in foreign trade 
and output were tempered by either common sense or the sheer 
inability to cut expenditures and raise taxes fast enough" (Diaz Ale- 
jandro 1984, p. 34). Regional or local governments sometimes took 
the lead in expansionary fiscal policies, as in Colombia where the role 
of central government was smaller than elsewhere in Latin America 
(Maddison 1985, pp. 28-29).
Finally, Latin American governments also engaged in other struc 
tural and reform policies that included wage flexibility and moderation, 
land reform, price regulation for rural products and public utilities, 
strengthening of credit institutions, and large public works programs 
(Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 36-37). In Mexico, for example, agrarian 
reform hastened a transfer of resources to the modern sector by 
increasing uncertainty about returns to investment in agriculture. Pub 
lic outlays for road construction reduced transport costs and enlarged 
the available market (Cardenas 1984, p. 233).
The outcome of this policy experimentation was growth rates of 
gross domestic product (GDP) during 1929-1939 that were steadier 
and higher for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico than for the 
United States and Canada. (Since population grew more rapidly in 
Latin America, the disparity in real per capita income growth was not 
as great.) More impressive than the growth rates was the extent of 
structural change and industrialization. There was substantial move 
ment from activities oriented toward export markets to those involving 
domestic sales. As import substitution surged, manufacturing grew 
much faster than GDP. Manufacturing growth rates during 1929-1939 
ranged from over 3 percent per year in Argentina to over 8 percent per 
year in Colombia, while remaining near zero in the United States and 
Canada (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 38^4).
Africa also provides examples of the Depression stimulating struc 
tural change and industrial development. Egypt was hard hit by the fall 
in the price of cotton, its major export. The resulting drop in the coun 
try's capacity to import created incentives for domestic manufacturing 
(Lee 1969, p. 152). By 1939, Egypt was meeting most of its local 
demand for simple products such as refined sugar, alcohol, cigarettes, 
soap, shoes, cement, and matches (Owen 1989, p. 142). Rather than
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exporting almost all its cotton, Egypt began to use it in its own facto 
ries, and investment funds shifted from export-oriented agriculture 
toward industry generally (Lee 1969, p. 153).
The Egyptian government protected industry by tariffs, which 
were revised after a treaty with Italy expired in 1930. Tariffs were 
especially important in blocking textile imports from Japan, India, and 
Italy, which were less expensive than products made from Egyptian 
cotton. By 1939, textile imports, which were 40 percent of the value of 
all imports in 1920, had fallen to 16.5 percent. The government aided 
industry in other ways as well, such as purchasing locally made cement 
for public construction projects. Industrial growth was not the sole 
focus; Egyptian leaders also sought to maintain a high level of cotton 
exports (Tignor 1984, pp. 106-146).
Other parts of Africa under colonial control had relatively little of 
the independence in setting policy that Diaz Alejandro identified as 
being important in successful Latin American cases (though some 
colonial powers, particularly the Belgians, were more attuned to the 
needs of industry than others). The Depression still had some positive 
impacts on industrialization. Clarence-Smith (1989, p. 195) argued 
that in the colonies of equatorial and central Africa, the main contribu 
tion of the 1930s was the strong signal it provided to private industrial 
ists about the potential of the home market and about the types of 
industries most suitable for the region.
Industries manufacturing cheap products for the African mass con 
sumer market did well even in the worst years of the early 1930s and 
fared better than industries producing for European settlers in many 
areas. Settler purchasing power fell; many settlers were heavily in debt 
and were hurt by deflation. In some places their numbers declined. 
Import substitution in the African market proceeded in soap and tex 
tiles and in some intermediate goods such as cement. The overall level 
of industrialization in equatorial and central Africa did not rise dramat 
ically in the 1930s, though the experiences of that decade did help to 
lay the groundwork for more rapid growth in Angola in the 1940s 
(Clarence-Smith 1989, pp. 170, 188-196). 7
In Asia as well, there was less policy autonomy than in Latin 
America during the Depression. Colonies were less able to impose 
trade and exchange controls, to engage in expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies that would generate some inflation, or to default on
The Economics of the Great Depression 47
debts. As in Africa, some colonial governments were more develop- 
mentalist than others. The Japanese practiced what Maddison called 
"military developmentalism" in Korea and Taiwan, which included 
encouraging some industrialization. Korean heavy industry provided 
intermediate products to Japan, and Taiwan produced fertilizers, tex 
tiles, metals, and chemicals. The British and Dutch followed more 
orthodox policies in their colonies (India, Indonesia), defending over 
valued currencies and pursuing deflationary policies (Maddison 1985, 
pp. 22, 33^3).
The Depression did, nonetheless, stimulate industrialization in 
some parts of India such as Madras, as the terms of trade moved to 
favor industry over agriculture and rural moneylenders sought new 
avenues for their funds. Investments were made in sugar refineries, 
cotton textile mills, cement, and electricity supply, as well as in banks, 
insurance companies, and the film industry. Record numbers of joint 
stock companies were registered in 1933-1937 (Baker 1978, pp. 238- 
242).
Japan grew very rapidly during the 1930s, and in this case, being 
linked to the world economy was crucial. Japanese exports rose by 70 
percent between 1929 and 1937, at a time when France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States all saw their exports fall. But 
Japanese export success in this period was based partly on an earlier 
phase of delinking and import substitution. During World War I, 
developed economies such as Britain were unable to supply manufac 
tured goods, and Japan began producing textiles both for the local 
market and for other Asian countries. Military spending in the 1930s 
also stimulated the growth of Japan's heavy industry (Maddison 1969, 
pp. 35-39).
China was at the other end of the spectrum during the Depression 
and was perhaps best described as "unlinked" rather than "delinked." 
The Chinese economy was so underdeveloped and internally oriented 
that it was largely immune to the shocks of the Depression. Myers 
(1989, pp. 256-259) summarized data showing that GDP grew in real 
terms at 1.55 percent per year during 1931-1936, and growth in manu 
facturing was considerably higher, at 2.11 percent. Some industries in 
the modern sector outpaced their Western counterparts. Coal produc 
tion in modern mines grew at 7.81 percent per year (this figure includes 
Manchuria, which had been seized by Japan in 1931-1932). Growth
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also was especially rapid in modern banking, electrical power, and 
postal services.
By the mid 1930s, China was engaging in relatively expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies, had increased tariffs, and was continuing 
the debt default and readjustment it had begun in the 1920s (Maddison 
1985, pp. 33-34). Internal trade boomed, much of the urban sector 
flourished, and new consumer goods became available. Rural distress 
occurred, but bad harvests were a major cause. Myers (1989, p. 274) 
concluded that "China simply did not experience any national eco 
nomic depression as the world depression deepened."
The import-substituting industrialization pursued by many less- 
developed countries during the Depression had its flaws. In Egypt, for 
example, locally produced goods were almost invariably more expen 
sive than those of foreign producers (Owen 1989, p. 142). But as Mad 
dison (1985, p. 23) argued, "In the conditions of the 1930s, the verdict 
must be in favor of the import substitution policies, for openness to the 
world economy of the type Cuba was compelled to follow meant large- 
scale unemployment of productive resources." He quickly went on to 
assert that in the longer run these measures, which continued in the 
1940s and 1950s, were a hindrance to growth.
By the 1970s, many critics were pointing to undesirable effects of 
import substitution policies and associated protectionist measures. 
They cited price distortions, resource misallocation, lack of competi 
tion in the industrial sector, and an anti-export bias. Movement away 
from inward-looking policies, initiated by Brazil, had begun in the 
1960s. Other countries followed in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly 
following the second oil shock and the debt crisis (Corbo 1992). Long- 
lasting negative impacts on growth from some of the inward-looking 
policies first adopted during the Depression recently were estimated by 
Taylor (1998). However, when comparing countries in Latin Amer 
ica's Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) 
with other Latin American countries, Taylor (1996) noted that the "big 
push" into manufacturing also may have generated dynamic externali 
ties with long-run benefits for at least some parts of Latin America. 8-9
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CONCLUSION
Like most episodes in economic history, the Depression of the 
1930s had winners and losers. In both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, certain industries flourished. Some of these industries pro 
duced the cheap luxuries that made the Depression more tolerable for 
those at the bottom of the income scale, as well as other new consumer 
goods (such as electrical appliances) whose use continued to grow 
even during these years of economic difficulty. However, while there 
were growth industries in both countries in the 1930s, these industries 
did not necessarily locate in the regions that most needed them. This 
was especially true in the United Kingdom, where expanding indus 
tries and services concentrated in the prosperous South and Midlands 
rather than in the older industrial areas of the North and West.
In the United States, it was the South—a poor, less-developed 
region—that had been the main problem region. The South was hit 
less hard than other U.S. regions by the Depression and recovered 
more quickly, for reasons that still are not fully understood. Short-run 
impacts of the New Deal were not responsible. New Deal spending 
went disproportionately to wealthy western states, where voting pat 
terns were less reliably Democratic than those of the South and where 
there had been especially sharp drops in income in 1929-1933. But in 
the longer run, New Deal agricultural and minimum wage policies 
broke down the isolation of the southern labor market and linked it to 
the national labor market. Without the remains of a plantation econ 
omy to protect, the South became more open to economic develop 
ment, especially after 1950.
Elsewhere in the world, the Depression of the 1930s had more 
immediate effects in stimulating industrialization. In these cases 
delinking, rather than linking, was what helped. As their export reve 
nues fell and capital inflows dried up, less-developed countries found 
themselves less able to import. Several of the larger, more independent 
countries in Latin America began experimenting with unorthodox, 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that cushioned the effects of 
the Depression. They also instituted policies that encouraged more 
domestic manufacturing. There was less scope for this response in 
Africa and Asia, where colonial control remained stronger. Egypt did
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follow a similar path of import substitution, and the Depression also 
created new awareness of the potential of African consumer markets in 
equatorial and central Africa.
It is interesting to speculate as to why, for the U.S. South, the 
Depression had positive effects through linking the South with a larger 
economy, whereas for less-developed countries it was delinking that 
proved beneficial. Delinking, of course, is not usually an option for 
regions in the same sense as for nations, although Jane Jacobs (1984) 
did argue that if it were possible there would be advantages to cities 
and their regions becoming independent sovereignties, issuing their 
own currencies and conducting their own policies. Perhaps part of the 
reason for the difference between the U.S. South and less-developed 
countries is that it was labor markets that were linked in the U.S. case. 
Is linking labor markets more beneficial than linking product and capi 
tal markets? Would less-developed countries have been better off in 
the 1930s and later decades if international barriers to migration had 
not been erected in the 1920s and more migration to richer countries 
had been possible (similar to the migration of displaced sharecroppers 
to the U.S. North)?
International labor markets were more linked, and migration wide 
spread, in the earlier period from 1870-1914. A group of scholars has 
argued that certain European areas with large outmigrations (Ireland, 
Sweden, and Italy) were better off as a result; the departure of the mov 
ers raised wages, reduced unemployment, and eroded poverty at home 
(Boyer, Hatton, and O'Rourke, 1994; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995; 
Williamson 1996; Taylor and Williamson 1997). However, southern 
Italy remained a less-developed region in the later 20th century. There 
also may be difficulties in applying these arguments to less-developed 
countries with very large populations, such as China or India.
Moreover, the U.S. South benefited from the outflow of labor 
partly because what followed were inflows of capital and skills. Would 
many less-developed nations or regions in the 1930s and later decades 
have seen similar inflows, on terms that would be beneficial to devel 
opment, if their labor markets were more linked to international ones? 
And did they have institutional and political structures that would have 
allowed them to use such inflows effectively?
The timing of the linking or delinking also may be important for 
either regions or nations. Although stimulated by Depression-era poli-
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cies, the actual linking of the U.S. South with the national economy 
came during the prosperous 1940s and 1950s. Clearly there are many 
questions that remain to be answered. My hope is that this consider 
ation of the uneven impacts of the Great Depression on industries, 
regions, and nations will have illustrated the complexity of that experi 
ence and will stimulate further thought about its consequences.
Notes
I thank Michael Bernstein, Carmen Diana Deere, Michael Edelstein, Susan Helper, 
Jane Humphries, Leonce Ndikumana, John Wallis, Jeffrey Williamson, and Gavin 
Wright for helpful discussions and suggestions for sources of information for this 
chapter. The chapter was revised slightly before publication to incorporate papers that 
were not available when it was presented in the public lecture series on which this book 
is based.
1. For individuals, experiences differed by race, age, gender, and other dimensions 
(Eichengreen and Hatton 1988, pp. 29-35 in the editors' introduction and chap 
ters by individual authors; Szostak 1995, pp. 308-309). See Bresnahan and Raff 
(1991) on differences among U.S. firms in the motor vehicles industry during the 
Depression.
2. On the debate over the role of new industries in pulling the United Kingdom out 
of depression, see Buxton (1975) and von Tunzelmann (1982).
3. There is evidence of a preference for greenfield sites and new labor in the recent 
location of Japanese auto transplants in the United States. Locations in or near the 
Midwest were chosen partly for proximity to other automotive firms and supplier 
networks. But the transplants often avoided large, older urban centers and hired 
rural workers, some of whom maintained connections to farms (Bingham and 
Eberts 1990, pp. 317-320; Mair, Florida, and Kenney 1988; Helper 1991; King- 
solver 1992). For example, Japanese automotive facilities located in the 1980s "in 
the exurban counties around Dayton and Columbus" (Blair and Fichtenbaum 
1990, p. 152). Smith and Florida (1994) sought to challenge this view, at least for 
Japanese-affiliated establishments in auto-related activities such as components, 
steel, finishing and processing, and rubber and tire manufacturing (i.e., not auto 
assembly establishments). There may be problems in their analysis arising from 
correlation between their population and population density variables.
4. Unemployment differentials among regions widened in some other countries as 
well. As in the United Kingdom, the absolute gap in unemployment rates 
increased by more than the ratio of rates in high- and low-unemployment areas 
(see the editors' introduction in Eichengreen and Hatton [1988, pp. 30-31]).
5. U.S. regions are defined differently by different authors. See the appendix for 
lists of states included in regions discussed in this paper.
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6. Not all southern states did well. In the Southeast the range was from 12 percent 
(North and South Carolina) to 34 percent (Arkansas). In the Southwest it was 27 
percent (Texas) to 40 percent (Arizona) (Hurwitz and Stallings 1957, pp. 248- 
249).
7. Interestingly, the food, beverage, and tobacco industries, which were relatively 
prosperous in the United States and the United Kingdom, fared rather badly. They 
were more closely tied to the settler market (Clarence-Smith 1989, pp. 194-195).
8. The section in Taylor (1996) comparing Latin America's Southern Cone and other 
Latin American countries was omitted in Taylor (1998), which focused exclu 
sively on the costs of inward-looking policies. The results in Taylor (1996) do, 
however, suggest variation in the experience of Latin American countries with 
such policies. All experienced costs, but some also may have experienced bene 
fits. It stands to reason that the larger Southern Cone countries, which embarked 
most strongly upon import-substituting industrialization, would reap the greatest 
benefits from the dynamic externalities that a long tradition of writers on eco 
nomic growth have emphasized.
9. The question of whether any of the policies pursued by governments of less- 
developed countries during the Depression would have been appropriate in the 
1970s to 1990s is a complicated one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Not all 
accept the idea that export-led industrialization was by the 1980s a universally 
desirable alternative to approaches maintaining some emphasis on domestic mar 
kets, nor do all accept a view of the state as primarily the problem rather than a 
part of the solution in less-developed countries. Fishlow (1990) argued that while 
more attention to market signals was appropriate, the degree of emphasis on liber 
alization and the invisible hand of the market that accompanied debt assistance 
plans of the 1980s went too far in denying a positive developmental role for the 
state. Earlier he suggested that even the import substitution of the 1930s to 1950s 
in Brazil might have suffered from an excessive reliance on the market, as it did 
not result in an articulated development bloc (Fishlow 1972, pp. 355-356). See 
Shapiro and Taylor (1990) for a survey on the role of the state and different devel 
opmental strategies. They noted that some successful export promotion strategies 
depended upon a previous phase of import substitution. Maddison (1985) and 
Thorp (1984, pp. 13-14) discussed comparisons between the 1930s and the 1970s 
and 1980s.
Appendix 
Definitions of Selected U.S. Regions









Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin
California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
Southwest:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
Louisiana is included in the Southeast in Perloff et al.'s discussion on p. 274. 
Later in the book it is included in the Southwest, due to the growth of the 
petroleum industry and oil-using industries in more recent decades.
Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997)
U.S. Census Divisions
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
California, Oregon, Washington (Alaska and Hawaii 
were included in this division from 1960 on)
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, 
West Virginia
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
East North Central: 






Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (cont.)
In the U.S. Census, the South includes the South Atlantic, East South Central, 
and West South Central divisions.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1995)
Southeast: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
Southwest: Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
U.S. War Production Board (1945)
Regions are not defined on pp. 35-36, but appear to be U.S. Census Divisions, 
as for Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997).
Wallis (1989)
U.S. Census Divisions, as for Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997). 
Wardwell (1951)
Southeast: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
Southwest: Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
Wright (1986)
South: At most, 11 states: 1) the Deep South states of
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina; 2) broadened by the addition of Arkansas, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee; 3) plus the "swing" 
states of Florida, Texas, and Virginia, which 
sometimes are dropped. For example, for aggregates 
such as land-labor ratios, including Texas would cause 
problems; for migration, Florida would be the problem 
state.
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